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THE FREE-MARKET APPROACH TO 
ADOPTION: THE VALUE OF A BABY 
Michele Goodwin*
Abstract: Adoption processes in the United States, once based on the 
altruistic child welfare model, have morphed to reºect the desires of 
would-be parents. The author argues that the current adoption model 
in the United States resembles an unregulated marketplace in children. 
Whether lawmakers and citizens wish to recognize this marketplace, its 
existence is demonstrated by frequent ªnancial transactions among 
adoptive parents, birth mothers, and adoption agencies that resemble 
payments. The author explores this marketplace and the way in which 
race, genetic traits, and class are implicated in adoption processes, 
resulting in higher fees associated with the adoption of children with 
desirable traits. The author proposes two mechanisms by which the 
government could regulate the adoption market—price caps and 
taxation. Ultimately, however, the author advocates greater transparency 
and information in the adoption process to protect the welfare of 
children who might otherwise be exploited in an unregulated adoption 
market. 
Introduction 
 The notion that children might be placed with families according 
to an auction paradigm too closely resembles the repulsive practices 
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of slavery.1 In an imagined version of auction competition, with a 
white billet in hand, one can push up the price of a child like a piece 
of furniture. In this suppositious scenario, spirited competition be-
tween bidders is encouraged by the auctioneer. An ebullient atmos-
phere heightens the intensity and legitimacy of the process; surely 
nothing so gleeful could possibly be malapropos? Finally, after the 
bidding competition concludes, with an unhesitating strike of the 
gavel, a birth certiªcate and baby are transferred. We may know very 
little about the winners (their character, composition, personality, in-
tegrity, and values) or the losers for that matter, except how high they 
were willing to bid on a child at that particular time. This is a scene 
most would abhor—even those willing to consider more transparent, 
incentive based adoption approaches. 
 The concept of a free market in children is rejected based on 
what it symbolizes, including its argued resemblance to slavery or the 
auction block.2 Yet, directly and indirectly, market forces or economic 
considerations inºuence adoptions in the United States to a greater 
extent than traditionally acknowledged.3 Conventional wisdom and 
early legislation held the best interest of children at the center of all 
adoptions,4 which functioned as a child welfare model for aban-
                                                                                                                      
1 The auction paradigm was the slave model, where children were forced to bear their 
teeth, toes, and even genitals to determine if they were “ªt.” See Marie Jenkins Schwartz, 
Born in Bondage: Growing Up Enslaved in the Antebellum South 160 (2000) (de-
scribing how “[p]urchasers relied on such external measurements to gauge whether the 
child had the strength, dexterity, physical stamina, and good health necessary for complet-
ing plantation chores.”); see also Touching It off Softly, Provincial Freeman (Toronto), Apr. 
29, 1854, at 1, 2 (relating a short historical account of slave auction practices). 
2 David M. Smolin, Intercountry Adoption as Child Trafªcking, 39 Val. U. L. Rev. 281, 287 
(2004) (arguing that adoption practices resemble the purchase of human beings, which is 
analogous to slavery practices). 
3 The high cost of adopting children (especially those in higher demand) is evidenced 
through schemes to subsidize the costs for adoptive parents. See Laura Bailey, Execs Expand 
Their Families Through Adoptions, Crain’s Detroit Bus., Nov. 1, 2004, at 22 (describing a 
system of tax credits for adoptive parents of both foreign and American children to ease 
the often hefty ªnancial burden of adoption); Joe Manning, More Firms Helping Staff with 
Costs of Adoption, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Aug. 23, 2004, at D1 (detailing that employers 
are providing beneªts to aid employees with fees associated with adoption, which have 
been described as “staggering”); Tess Nacelewicz, More Love Than Money, Portland Press 
Herald, Sept. 27, 2004, at A1 (describing a family who wished to adopt two additional 
Haitian children, and the community organized fundraisers to help the family raise money 
for the adoption fees.); Sylvia Slaughter, Penny for Your Thoughts of Samuel, The Tennessean 
(Nashville), Oct. 23, 2004, at 1 (describing a charity project in which residents collect 
change to help defray the costs of adoption for a local family). 
4 See Ruth Arlene Howe, Adoption Laws and Practices in 2000: Serving Whose Interests?, 33 
Fam. L.Q. 677, 677 (2000). 
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doned, abused, neglected and orphaned youth.5 Contemporary adop-
tion services, however, resemble free markets where aesthetic proªles 
of race, hair texture, eye color and other market variables determine 
the welfare of children or, at least, their likelihood of placement.6 Be-
tween two ends of a spectrum, one representing child welfare and the 
other “adult needs,” the latter inºuences U.S. adoptions far more 
than imagined.7
 This article scrutinizes ªnancial considerations involved in adop-
tion, including “baby valuing” and suggests that those transactions 
illustrate the market nature of adoptions in the United States. This 
article illuminates market consciousness in the adoption process, ar-
guing that economic interests inºuence adoption more than we 
might like to acknowledge.8 It demonstrates that the adoption process 
is more like a market than less so. Part I frames the adoption market 
debate, arguing that current adoption indeed resembles a free mar-
ket. It describes current adoption processes in the United States, 
which are governed by factors of availability, race, class, and aesthetic 
preferences. Part II scrutinizes the moral and ethical obstacles to rec-
ognition of a market in adoption: the degradation of personhood, the 
charitable roots of child placement, and the social costs associated 
with adoption. Part III examines alternative adoption models, includ-
ing price caps and taxation alternatives, and suggests that each model 
tramples on established values. The article argues for greater trans-
parency and information in the adoption process and proposes a dif-
ferent model to effectuate adoptions in the United States. 
                                                                                                                      
5 See Jehnna Irene Hanan, The Best Interest of the Child: Eliminating Discrimination in the 
Screening of Adoptive Parents, 27 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 167, 174–75 (1997). In 1851, Mas-
sachusetts passed the ªrst adoption law in the United States. Id. at 174. That law served as a 
model for other states, with each state’s law “emphasizing the best interests of the child.” 
Id. at 174–75. 
6 Smolin, supra note 2, at 282 (stating that, “the adoption system has become so inter-
twined with market behavior as to, in theory and practice, frequently permit child selling 
as a form of adoption”). See also Patricia J. Williams, Spare Parts, Family Values, Old Children, 
Cheap, 28 New Eng. L. Rev. 913, 918 (1994) (“And with that magical stroke of the pen, the 
door to a whole world of plentiful, newborn, brown-skinned little boys . . . opened up to 
me from behind the curtain marked, ‘Doesn’t Care.’”). 
7 See Howe, supra note 4, at 677–78. 
8 Smolin, supra note 2, at 306 (“[T]he effect is to create a market in babies, with high-
demand characteristics of the infant (race, youth, and health) . . . . being allocated to the 
highest bidder. This contradicts the legal conception that adoption is guided principally by 
the best interests of the child . . . .”). 
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I. The Posner Paradigm 
A. The Market Debate 
 Nearly thirty years ago, Elisabeth Landes and Richard Posner at-
tracted strident criticism from scholars concerned that their 1978 
publication on adoption, colloquially known as the “baby selling arti-
cle,” endorsed a market in babies.9 In this article, Landes and Posner 
proposed evaluating the efªciency of adoption through a market 
analysis.10 They applied a law and economics framework to study the 
pros and cons of incentives in adoption as well as mechanisms that 
could increase the matching of babies to couples.11 Ironically, their 
article drew criticism about incentive models that preexisted the arti-
cle’s publication.12 Opponents decried the language of efªciency in 
evaluating adoptions, suggesting that it reduced children to objects in 
a mechanical economic analysis.13
 Posner and Landes’ critics characterized their article, The Econom-
ics of the Baby Shortage, as promoting the introduction of ªnancial in-
centives in the adoption allocation process, thereby suggesting that 
Landes and Posner were tainting an unºawed and otherwise purely 
altruistic process.14 Transaction fees received by adoption agencies 
were believed to be so minimal or infrequently present at the time as 
to pose insigniªcant ethical problems. Some critics thereby dismissed 
the resemblance between transactional fees, indirect incentives, and 
payments. They refused to entertain the proposition that an adoption 
“market” already existed. 
 Refusal then and now to acknowledge ªnancial incentives in 
adoption does not negate the free market’s existence and inºuence in 
adoption services. In other words, a community preference that adop-
                                                                                                                      
9 See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Coping with Life, Law, and Markets: A Comment on Posner and 
the Law-and-Economics Debate, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 73, 73 (1987); Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. Legal Stud. 323, 339–46 (1978). 
10 Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 324. 
11 Id. at 324–39. 
12 See Robert S. Prichard, A Market for Babies?, 34 U. Toronto L.J. 341, 350, 354 (1984). 
13 See Cass, supra note 9, at 76–77. 
14 For an overview of common objections to Landes & Posner, see Prichard, supra note 
12, at 350, 354 (ªnding that a market in children would lead to an unequal distribution of 
“good babies . . . . [T]he objection seems to assume that this does not happen already, thus 
ignoring the reality that one’s income and wealth are generally thought . . . to be impor-
tant . . . .” Objectors also claim that the market analysis focuses solely on the social end of 
pleasing adoptive parents rather than the welfare of the child.). 
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tions are free from ªnancial transactions does not mean that it is so.15 
Financial transactions and interests govern the adoption process both 
directly and indirectly. Financial exchanges, including exorbitant fees 
paid to adoption agencies, medical payments to birth mothers (or 
surrogates in the case of in vitro babies), transportation costs and liv-
ing expenses,16 while characterized under the umbrella of “transac-
tional costs,” resemble “payments” in most other spheres.17 Some 
commentators, including Posner, have described these payments as 
part of the adoption “black market.”18 To be clear, there seems to be 
very little that is illegal about these transactions.19 Rather, exorbitant 
transaction fees, and direct payments to parents and their attorneys 
are evidence of a de facto, largely unregulated, adoption free market.20
B. The Free Market: Indirect & Direct 
1. Lack of Regulation 
 Several factors indicate the free market in adoptions. First, adop-
tion services are a largely under-regulated and disorganized enter-
prise.21 Lack of regulation is a key factor in free-market econom-
                                                                                                                      
15 See Francesco Parisi & Ben W.F. Depoorter, Continuing Tributes to the Honorable Rich-
ard A. Posner—Private Choices and Public Law: Richard A. Posner’s Contributions to Family Law 
and Policy, 17 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 403, 411 (2001) (arguing that the “selling” 
of babies already legally takes place). 
16 See Nat’l Adoption Info. Clearinghouse, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., State Regulation of Adoption Expenses: Summary of State Laws 1 (2005), 
available at http://naic.acf.hhs.gov/general/legal/statutes/expensesall.pdf. 
17 Smolin, supra note 2, at 304 (likening payment of birth-related expenses to birth 
mothers to ªnancial consideration for a right of ªrst refusal if the birth mother ultimately 
decides to place the child in an adoptive home). 
18 See Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 339–40. 
19 See, e.g., Donald J. Boudreaux, A Modest Proposal to Deregulate Infant Adoptions, 15 
Cato Journal 117, 119 (1995) (describing that state laws govern monetary compensation 
given to birth mothers, which is allowed for out-of-pocket expenses related to the birth and 
prenatal care). 
20 See Danielle Saba Donner, The Emerging Adoption Market: Child Welfare Agencies, Private 
Middlemen, and “Consumer” Remedies, 35 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 473, 490 (1996) (arguing 
that the shift to a fee structure in the adoption process is a response to market forces). 
21 Data on adoption is often inconsistent and unreliable because there is not a special-
ized agency responsible for adoption data collection. See, e.g., Nat’l Adoption Info. 
Clearinghouse, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., How Many Children Were 
Adopted in 2000 and 2001? 14 (2004), available at http://naic.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/ 
s_adopted/index.pdf. 
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ics.22 Babies can be adopted indirectly through the free market by way 
of an agency process, wherein fees are bundled and an adoptive couple 
pays one fee that supports salaries for staff, medical expenses for the 
birth mother, and transportation costs.23 Babies can also be adopted 
directly through the free market via independent agents who facilitate 
the process, which includes lawyers, pastors, and doctors acting as in-
termediaries.24 Unlike agencies, independent agents may be interested 
in only one, speciªc adoption. These processes are not monitored by 
any federal agency. Rather, state laws govern part of the adoption proc-
esses, but are generally inadequate in addressing the interstate and 
transnational aspect of adoptions. Thus, under the guise of promoting 
child welfare, contemporary adoption practices have exposed children 
to free-market dynamics. In the free-market realm, supply, demand and 
aesthetic preference factor signiªcantly in the cost of a baby.25
2. Race-based Baby Valuing 
 Second, baby valuing indicates that racial and genetic prefer-
ences are associated with the cost of adoption. Consider the following: 
couples may spend upwards of $50,000 to adopt a healthy, white in-
                                                                                                                      
22 See, e.g., Robert B. Horowitz, Understanding Deregulation, 15 Theory & Society 139, 
160–64, 168–69 (1986) (explaining that deregulation of a given market (i.e., telecommu-
nications) must occur in order to obtain a truly free and competitive marketplace). 
23 Nat’l Adoption Info. Clearinghouse, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Adoption Options: A Fact Sheet for Families 1, 2 (2003), available at http://naic. 
acf.hhs.gov/pubs/f_adoptoption.cfm [hereinafter Adoption Options: A Fact Sheet for 
Families]. 
24 Id. at 3–4. 
25 See Marianne Bitler & Madeline Zavodny, Did Abortion Legalization Reduce the Number 
of Unwanted Children? Evidence from Adoptions, 34 Persps. on Sexual and Reprod. Health 
25, 26, 27 (2002); Mark F. Testa, When Children Cannot Return Home: Adoption and Guardian-
ship, 14 Future of Child. 115, 118 (2004). Distinctive adoption practices can be seen 
prior to and after 1973, the year of the landmark Roe v. Wade decision. Bilder & Zadvodny, 
supra at 25–26. Prior to 1973, abortions were illegal, and single-motherhood and unwed 
pregnancies were taboo. Almost twenty percent of unwed white women placed their chil-
dren for adoption prior to 1973. Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Inst., Private Domestic 
Adoption Facts (2002), http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/FactOverview/domestic.html. 
Since 1973, researchers estimate that as few as 1.7 % of white unwed mothers have placed 
their babies up for adoption. Id. Some commentators attribute the low surrender rates to 
the legalization of abortions (i.e. women are choosing to abort rather than have babies). 
Bilder & Zadvodny, supra at 31. On the other hand, single-parenthood is less stigmatized 
now among certain classes of Americans than prior to 1973. See Bilder & Zadvodny, supra at 
26, 27; Testa, supra at 118. 
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fant.26 Black infants, however, are adopted for as little as $4,000.27 
Adoption agencies attempt to clarify this discrepancy by explaining 
that black children are more difªcult to place than white children, 
and, therefore, the costs associated with adopting Caucasian children 
are higher.28 This logic appears ºawed, even though it is true that 
black children wait longer for permanent placements.29 Why would it 
cost more to do less, if transaction costs were based purely on the labor 
and transactions involved?30 If placing white children is easier than 
placing black children, it would seem that less work would result in less 
pay and lower fees. Instead, fee structures based on race give evidence 
that adoption is subject to the free-market forces of supply, demand, 
and preference.31 In this market, racial preference matters; bi-racial 
children also attract higher fees than black children.32
                                                                                                                      
26 See Bonnie Miller Rubin, Adoption Bill Targets Legal Loopholes, Chi. Trib., Mar. 27, 
2005, at Metro 1, 4 (describing how the price of a [presumably white] American infant can 
“hit the $50,000 mark”). 
27 See Dusty Rhodes, Baby Trade, Ill. Times, Feb. 17, 2005, available at http://www.illi- 
noistimes.com/gyrobase/Content?oid=oid%3A3990. 
28 See Judith K. McKenzie, Adoption of Children with Special Needs, 3 Future of Child., 
62, 62 (1993) (characterizing children of color as having “special needs” resulting in more 
difªcult placement into an adoptive home). 
29 See Carla M. Curtis & Ramona W. Denby, Impact of the Adoption and Safe Families Act 
(1997) on Families of Color: Workers Share Their Thoughts, 85 Families in Soc’y: J. Contemp. 
Soc. Servs. 71, 71 (2004) (stating generally that children of color wait longer in foster 
care to be adopted than do their white counterparts). 
30 Historically, to the extent that discrimination was legally enforced and social values 
with regard to reproduction were delineated according to race and socio-economic status, 
adoption services were affected as was any other social institution. Thus, the best interest 
of young black children was, at best, limited to a model that restricted those adoptions to 
black families--a model that the National Black Social Workers Organization would later 
endorse. See Hanan, supra note 5, at 176–77 (describing the National Association of Black 
Social Workers’ objection to interracial adoption as negatively affecting the formation of 
the child’s racial identity); Larry Elder, Exporting Black/White Adoptions, Long Beach 
Press-Telegram (California), Feb. 28, 2005, at A15 (“According to the National Adoption 
Center, government still allows agencies to use variables to calculate the ‘best interest of 
the child.’”). As a contemporary model, the disproportionately low adoption rate for black 
children in foster care gives some indication of the continued illusory nature of adoption 
as a specialized child-focused welfare service model. See Richard P. Barth, Effects of Age and 
Race on the Odds of Adoption versus Remaining in Long-Term Out-of-Home Care, 76 Child Wel-
fare 285, 288 (1997) (noting that white children in the Michigan foster care system are 
three times more likely to be adopted than black children). 
31 See Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market?: A New and Improved 
Theory of Commodiªcation, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2003) (“Children who are racial minorities, 
such as African-American children, are sometimes cheaper to adopt than white children, a 
differential that seems to turn more on supply and demand than on agencies expending 
more money to place white children.”). 
32 See Rhodes, supra note 27 (describing how some adoption agencies charge more for 
biracial children than African-American children). 
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 Even though an “estimated 2 million American families” are 
looking to adopt, the majority will pass over black children for chil-
dren from abroad.33 A recent study reveals the ways that race matters 
in adoption.34 While 86.4% of black women would accept a white 
child, only 72.5% of white women would accept a black child, and 
only 1.8% of white women expressed a preference for a black child.35 
Most notably, more women expressed a preference for adopting a 
child with severe physical or mental disabilities than a preference for 
adopting a black child.36
 In reality, adoption agencies and independent adoption agents 
establish fees with adoptive parents based on the characteristics of the 
children in the adoption supply pool, such as, race, gender, and sup-
posed genetic strengths, including the parents’ intellectual aptitude.37 
In U.S. adoptions, white children are more highly valued than black 
children by both adoption agencies and by those who seek to adopt 
them.38 Further, adoptive parents are acutely aware that competition 
                                                                                                                      
33 See 60 Minutes: Born In USA; Adopted in Canada (CBS television broadcast Mar. 10, 
2005). 
34 Anjani Chandra et al., Adoption, Adoption Seeking, and Relinquishment for Adoption in the 
United States, Advance Data, May 11, 1999, at 9, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/ 
data/ad/ad306.pdf. 
35 Id. at 8 (see Table 4). 
36 Id. 
37 See David Ray Papke, Pondering Past Purposes: A Critical History of American Adoption 
Law, 102 W. Va. L. Rev. 459, 469 (1999) (framing modern adoption in the era of con-
sumption: “[i]n addition to purchasing their share of conventional consumer goods, many 
also seek to obtain the child held out by advertising and general cultural imagery as cen-
tral to a good, successful life”). Furthermore, several cases bear out the assumption that 
adoption has become a market governed by the laws of economics and that the adoptive 
parents’ wishes to obtain a healthy, genetically desirable child are paramount in the adop-
tion process. The adoptive parents are considered “consumers” who have a right to be 
informed. See Donner, supra note 20, at 518–24. For example, in the case of Michael J., the 
court awarded judgment to the adoptive parents of a child with a genetic disorder. Michael 
J. v. L.A. County Dep’t of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504, 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). The 
child possessed symptoms of the disease at the time of his adoption (manifested in a visible 
port wine stain birthmark) but the adoption agency took no further action to investigate 
the underlying cause of the child’s condition. Id. at 505. The court “implicitly applied an 
economic analysis of the adoption process” and implied that the “allocation of risk on 
adoptive parents [was] unconscionable.” See Donner, supra note 20, at 519–20. The case of 
M.H. also illustrates how the adoptive parents’ interests are being served by the courts in 
deciding adoption cases. M.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Minn. 1992). 
The court permitted a negligent misrepresentation action by the adoptive parents of a 
child when the adoption agency failed to disclose that the child was a product of incest. Id. 
at 288. 
38 See Mary Mitchell, Adoption Swamp Grows Murkier with Drug Charges, Chi. Sun Times, 
Mar. 22, 2005, at 14 (“[T]he fees at a lot of adoption agencies [are based on] the color of 
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is involved in free-market adoptions.39 Thus, those serious about 
adopting a white baby, and with the resources to do so, realize balking 
at the high costs associated with those adoptions would prove futile. 
 But for the racialized nature of adoption, the market in babies 
and children might be less detectable. If U.S. adoptions were primar-
ily focused on child welfare, rather than adult need, the price of white 
children would not exceed that of black children. Why spend more to 
adopt a white child, if in fact the social service motivation is the 
same—to serve the best interest of a child? Thus, pursuit of the best 
interests of children in adoptions is an easily consumable ªction. Even 
if the rate of adoption for white children exceeded that of their black 
counterparts, black children would be second in line to foreign adop-
tion if the fulªllment of the best interests for U.S. children were the 
reality. But sadly, it is not. According to the Department of Health and 
Human Services, many couples wait more than eighteen months, and 
spend as much as $30,000 to adopt children from abroad,40 bypassing 
the less expensive and less desired black children.41 In fact, according 
to a recent report, adoption of black children can be facilitated in less 
than three weeks.42
                                                                                                                      
the baby’s skin. Babies who have two white parents cost the most and those who have two 
black [parents] cost the least.”). 
39 See Gay Jervey, Pricele$$, Money, Apr. 1, 2003, at 119 (a couple describes the life-style 
changes they underwent when they decided to adopt: “[My husband] took a ‘real job’ . . . . 
To adopt, we had to appear to be solid, and we also needed the money . . . . Unless you’re 
independently wealthy, you have to ªt the norm.”). 
40 Nat’l Adoption Info. Clearinghouse, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., In-
tercountry Adoption 1, 3 (2001) available at http://naic.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/f_inter/f_inter. 
pdf [hereinafter Intercountry Adoption]. 
41 In researching for this article, the highest fee associated with black adoptions was 
$19,000. The lowest fees included nearly free permanent placements involving children 
from foster care. See, e.g., Gabrielle Glaser, The Price(s) to Adopt, Oregonian, July 4, 2004, at 
L01 (a couple adopting an African-American child can expect to wait between one to nine 
months and pay $12,000–$19,000); Adoption Options: A Fact Sheet for Families, supra 
note 23, at 3 (children can be adopted from foster care without the adoptive parents in-
curring any, or very few, costs). 
42 60 Minutes: Born In USA; Adopted in Canada, supra note 33. 
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3. Social Valuing 
If the mother wanted to show a commitment to her daughter, then she 
should learn English to the extent that her daughter had . . . .43
 
 The third factor that provides evidence of a free market in U.S. 
adoptions is the use of social status of adoptive parents in the child 
allocation process. Adoptive parents’ social status, including house-
hold income, family type, and immigration status ªgures signiªcantly 
in adoption decision-making.44 Angela Kupenda, Zanita Fenton, and 
other child-welfare law scholars provide a race-based critique of the 
challenges faced by families of color seeking to adopt.45 According to 
these scholars, black families face greater obstacles in qualifying for 
child placements.46 They suggest that the prevalence of single parent 
households and lower income status weighs against black families.47 
                                                                                                                      
43 Shaila Dewan, Two Families, Two Cultures and the Girl Between Them, N.Y. Times, May 
12, 2005, at A16 (quoting Amanda Crowel, the lawyer for the couple petitioning to adopt 
Linda Berrera Cano). 
44 See Randall B. Hicks, Adopting in America: How to Adopt Within One Year 12 
(4th ed. 2004) (describing the importance of adoptive parents’ ability to demonstrate 
ªnancial security to adoption agencies, including those agencies that place an emphasis on 
a permanent stay-at-home parent). 
45 These scholars also suggest that black families tend to adopt within their families, 
which avoids the costly transaction fees imposed by agencies. See Zanita E. Fenton, In a 
World Not Their Own: The Adoption of Black Children, 10 Harv. BlackLetter L.J. 39, 42–43 
(1993) (describing the slavery origins of informal adoption by extended family members, 
which is still common within African-American communities); Angela Mae Kupenda, Law, 
Life and Literature: Using Literature and Life to Expose Transracial Adoption Laws as Adoption on 
a One-Way Street, 17 Buff. Pub. Int. L.J. 43, 49–50 (1998–1999); see also Rose M. Kreider, 
U.S. Census Bureau, Adopted Children and Step Children: 2000, at 2–3 (Oct. 2003), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-6.pdf (illustrating that informal 
adoption of children is more common in certain cultural groups, including the Inupiaq in 
Alaska, Blacks, and Hispanics). Because of the structure of the adoption identiªcation 
category, the data from the 2000 Census cannot differentiate among different types of 
adoption, including informal and formal adoptions. 
46 See Kupenda, supra note 45, at 49–50 (citing problems such as the frequency that 
black families are rated as “unqualiªed” to adopt, the scarcity of black professionals em-
ployed by adoption agencies, the presence of hefty adoption fees, and the lack of adoption 
subsidies). 
47 See Juan J. Battle, What Beats Having Two Parents?: Education Outcomes for African 
American Students in Single- versus Dual-Parent Families, 28 J. Black Stud. 783, 783 (1998) 
(noting that in 1991, 57.5% of African-American children lived with only one parent); see 
also U.S. Census Bureau, People: Income and Employment, available at http:// 
factªnder.census.gov (follow “People” hyperlink; then follow “Read about Income and 
Employment” hyperlink) (“Black households had the lowest median income. Their 2003 
median money income was about $30,000, which was 62 percent of the median non-
Hispanic White households.”). 
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Thus, potential black adoptive parents are comparatively less competi-
tive players in the free market for children; they will lose more often 
than white parents, even if their goals are to adopt black children.48
 More recently, immigration status might affect whether parental 
rights are protected or possibly terminated.49 A prime example oc-
cured when a Tennessee court recently removed an eleven-year-old 
girl, Linda Berrera Cano, from the custody of her mother, a Mexican 
migrant worker, and placed her with a family that “lives in a brick 
ranch house with a basketball hoop in the driveway, a swimming pool 
in the backyard.”50 Ironically, Linda Berrera Cano was never surren-
dered by her mother to the state, nor was she in foster care when she 
was placed with the Patterson family.51 Instead, Linda was simply a 
poor, migrant worker’s child who missed some days of school to care 
for her siblings. One of Linda’s teachers took a special interest in her 
and petitioned for her adoption.52 The case attracted considerable 
attention as Judge Barry Tatum demanded that the mother, Felipa 
Berrera, learn to speak English before visitations would be permitted 
with her daughter, whose ªrst language is Spanish.53
 Tennessee law provides for direct petition to courts in cases of 
child abuse and neglect. Most would view this law as progress and in 
the best interest of children, after all, it avoids delays in removal from 
dangerous situations. Deciding, however, whether this case and its af-
termath have been focused on the welfare of the child or the desires 
of the adults is more complicated. The facts of the Berrera case seem 
unique, but it does provide limited precedent for wealthier individu-
                                                                                                                      
48 See Ruth G. McRoy et al., Achieving Same-Race Adoptive Placements for African-American 
Children: Culturally Sensitive Practice Approaches, 76 Child Welfare 85, 89 (1997) (describ-
ing “a National Urban League study of 800 African-American families who applied to 
adopt,” and a mere two of the 800 were approved for adoption); see also Erika Lynn Klei-
man, Caring for Our Own: Why American Adoption Law and Policy Must Change, 30 Colum. J.L. 
& Soc. Probs. 327, 359 (1997) (noting that “traditional standards governing parent eligi-
bility are biased against minority parents, and this may be one of the reasons why there is a 
dearth of minority parents available to adopt minority children”). 
49 See U.S. Census Bureau, The Foreign-Born Population: Census 2000 Brief 3 
(Dec. 2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-34.pdf (noting that 
there are 31.1 million foreign-born individuals in the United States, comprising 11.1 % of 
the total population, and that naturalized citizens constitute 40.3 % of the foreign-born 
population). 
50 Dewan, supra note 43, at A16. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. It is more than likely that Linda suffered from the conditions that poverty typi-
cally produces. But, is it reasonable to address the underlying conditions of poverty 
through the arbitrary displacements of children from their parents? 
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als to directly petition the courts to adopt handpicked children. Pov-
erty, immigrant status, limited political clout, and limited English 
proªciency may factor signiªcantly in one’s ability to effectively com-
pete for a child, despite a biological connection.54
4. Unrestrained International Market 
 Finally, private, transnational adoptions provide evidence of mar-
ket competition. Foreign adoptions ªgure signiªcantly in U.S. adoption 
services, with growth on two fronts.55 First, overwhelmingly, white cou-
ples who are unable to locate white children for adoption in the United 
States are increasingly looking and adopting children from abroad, in-
cluding China, Guatemala, Russia, and the eastern European coun-
tries.56 Couples who decide to adopt from abroad pay far more than 
the costs associated with adopting black children in the United States. 
These costs include international transportation fees, transactional 
costs with foreign governments, and local and foreign fees.57 In this 
way, they exercise another key component of free markets: choice.58
 Second, a notable trend is affecting the lives of African-American 
children. Canadians, Germans, Swedes, and other predominantly white 
ethnic groups are adopting black children from the United States.59 
With open adoptions, there are no restrictions on the adoption of 
American children to foreign couples, as long as they can meet the re-
quirements and fees established by adoption agencies and birth par-
ents.60 Of the many ironies, one which has not escaped the scrutiny of 
commentators, is the dramatic difference in costs associated with these 
                                                                                                                      
54 Id. 
55 See Kreider, supra note 45, at 12 (“In 2000, 13 percent of adopted children of 
householders of all ages were foreign born.”). 
56 See Dawn Davenport, Born in America, Adopted Abroad, Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 
27, 2004, at 11. 
57 Adoption Options: A Fact Sheet for Families, supra note 23, at 2. 
58 See Kleiman, supra note 48, at 363 (noting the irony in the adoption of foreign chil-
dren: since many international adoptions are also transracial, the adoptive parents en-
counter many of the same cultural problems as they would have if they had adopted a 
[‘less expensive’] minority child in the United States). 
59 See Davenport, supra note 56; Anne-Marie O’Neill, Joanne Fowler & Ron Arias, Why 
Are American Babies Being Adopted Abroad?, People, June 6, 2005, at 64 (describing that some 
American birth mothers simply choose foreign adoptive parents based on the perception 
that other countries might be less race-conscious than the United States). 
60 See O’Neill, supra note 59 (noting that “looser federal regulations allow even new-
borns to leave [American] borders.”). 
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adoptions. The adoption of African-American babies and children usu-
ally costs less than half the cost of adopting a white baby.61
II. Market Pitfalls & Conventional Wisdom 
 According to conventional wisdom, the needs and best interest of 
children would always prevail over the special interest of the adults 
seeking to adopt them.62 Conventional wisdom, therefore, rightfully 
rejected the proposition of a child being placed into an abusive family 
or one that sought to exploit the child’s labor, sex, or talent. In reality, 
however, adoption has never been a ºawless system.63 Indeed, adop-
tion is no longer a domestic welfare service that attends primarily to 
the needs of children born in the United States.64 Rather, adoption is 
a multi-million dollar transnational service where aesthetics and ge-
netic traits are signiªcantly scrutinized.65 There are pitfalls in the free-
                                                                                                                      
61 See Intercountry Adoption, supra note 40 (adopting a child internationally can 
cost up to $30,000); Rhodes supra note 27 (noting the cost for an African-American child is 
a mere $4,000); Rubin, supra note 26 (noting the cost for a [white] American infant can 
“hit the $50,000 mark”). 
62 After the enactment of the ªrst modern state adoption statute in 1851, adoption in 
the United States evolved as both a state judicial process and a specialized child welfare 
service to promote the best interest of children in need of permanent homes. See Hanan, 
supra note 5, at 174 (noting that modern adoption laws, beginning in 1851, were designed 
to serve the best interests of the child, no longer to merely provide adoptive parents with 
heirs, as did early American adoption laws based on the Roman model). 
63 The conventional wisdom worked optimally when adoption was viewed through a 
contextual lens. For example, over ªve hundred thousand children live in foster care ar-
rangements, and sixty-one percent of all those in the public foster-care system are children 
of color. See Admin. for Children and Families, Admin. on Children, Youth & Fami-
lies, Children’s Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The AFCARS Report: 
Preliminary Estimates for FY 2002, at 1, 2 (2004), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/ 
programs/cb/publications/afcars/report9.pdf. Children of color will wait considerably 
longer for adoption than their white counterparts. (For statistics regarding placement and 
length of stay of children in foster care see id.) White children in the Michigan foster care 
system are three times more likely to be adopted than black children. See Barth, supra note 
30, at 288. Yet, the adoption of white children may have less to do with early child welfare 
considerations of the 1850s and social altruism. Rather adult desires factor signiªcantly in 
this process, meaning children are not necessarily being adopted to simply provide a chari-
table service; if that were so, fewer African-American children would be bypassed for for-
eign adoptions. Because race matters in adoptions, child welfare may be secondary to the 
market constraints imposed by the costs of racism in the United States. 
64 See Kleiman, supra note 48, at 366 (“American adoption law- and policy-makers claim 
to focus on the protection of children’s best interests. If this were their true concern, how-
ever, adoption laws would facilitate the placement of children with families that want them. 
Instead, current laws and policies create a strong incentive for American parents to adopt 
foreign children.”). 
65 As mentioned above, since the adoption process in the United States is not adminis-
tered by any single entity, exact data relating to the worth of the adoption industry is not 
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market model, however, where ªnances prevail over child welfare and 
the best interests of children are subordinate to adult preference. 
 Critics of the free market in adoption have rightfully illuminated 
the tensions involved with ªnancial considerations of “sensitive sub-
jects” 66 or what Professor Margaret Radin refers to as the “market in-
alienable.”67 For example, Professor Radin argues that our very “per-
sonhood” is threatened by the rapid expanse of commodiªcation in 
our daily reality.68 Yet, what even the most insightful critics fail to 
grasp or overlook, however, is the diminution of value according to 
race and social hierarchies that are born out of the free-market 
model. The free-market model is not like slavery, but it does repro-
duce the class and social distinctions found in the legacy of American 
slavery.69 Free-market opponents have advanced two main ideological 
criticisms. The ªrst criticism was that a market analysis was always in-
appropriate to the study of human subjects.70 Second, critics sug-
gested that although costs are involved in the adoption process, it is 
unfair and inaccurate to characterize those fees in market terms.71 In 
other words, to imply that the adoption process is subject to market 
forces of supply, demand, and preferences would tarnish the reputa-
tion of the industry.72
                                                                                                                      
known. See generally U.S. Census Bureau, Industry Series: Summary Statistics for the 
United States: 2002 Economic Census 3 (see table 2) ( July 2004), available at http:// 
www.census.gov/prod/ec02/ec0262.04.pdf (Data from the 2002 Economic Census esti-
mates that the “child and youth services” industry, which includes adoption, has an annual 
payroll of 3.3 billion dollars. The data also indicate revenue of the industry is nearly 9.5 
billion dollars.). See also Glaser, supra note 41, at L01 (“In 2001, Marketdata Enterprises . . . 
reported that adoption services were a $1.4 billion industry in the United States . . . .”). 
66 See Rahel Jaeggi, The Market’s Price, 8 Constellations 400, 408 (2001); Mario Mo-
relli, Commerce in Organs: A Kantian Critique, 30 J. Soc. Phil. 315, 318 (1999); Michael 
Rushton, The Law and Economics of Artists’ Inalienable Rights, 25 J. Cultural Econ. 243, 248 
(2001). 
67 Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1850 (1987). 
68 See Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities 154–63 (1996). 
69 See Twila L. Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and 
Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 33, 55 (1993–1994) (noting that some 
blacks question “whether the system of white control over the fate of Black children” that 
dates back to slavery has changed. “To some Blacks, [the placement of Black children in 
white homes by white-dominated social service agencies] suggest[s] that the disempower-
ment of enslaved Blacks has continued in modern-day America.”). 
70 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 6, at 918 (implying that applying a cold, scientiªc 
analysis to something as unscientiªc as adoption is not appropriate: “I am trying, quite 
intentionally, to problematize the clean, scientiªc way in which the subject is often dis-
cussed.”). 
71 See Ertman, supra note 31, at 52 (criticizing Landes & Posner’s approach—”scholars 
do not see parenthood and cash as completely commensurable”). 
72 See id. 
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 Unfortunately, ªnancial incentives in adoptions cannot be easily 
dismissed, nor can policy-makers, scholars, and child welfare advo-
cates pretend that by ignoring class and the considerable costs in-
volved in domestic and international adoptions, that a market has not 
developed. To ignore the less attractive nuances of adoptions is to 
presume that adoption services in the United States operate entirely 
for the best interest of children, and adult interests are always subor-
dinated to those of children. Were the best interest of all adoptable 
children served by unacknowledged market considerations, there 
would be very little need for further scholarship scrutinizing the me-
chanics of adoption. After all, adoption is a very sensitive process that 
involves vulnerable children and adults, as both groups have an inter-
est in being part of a loving family.73
III. Values & Social Impact 
 This article has argued that a free market in adoptions already 
exists and that altruism as a primary goal in adoption has been over-
shadowed by supplication to parental desires. Financial incentives, 
payments to mothers, exorbitant fees provided to adoption agencies 
and the robust enterprise of independent, direct adoptions provide 
evidence of free-market forces in adoption. Determining, then, 
whether the state has a future role in shaping the adoption market or 
allowing it to freely exist without state interference is a relevant and 
timely question. Because parental autonomy has been so strongly 
guarded within the common law and constitutional law tradition, 
scholars may tend to overlook the government’s arguable afªrmative 
duty to be involved in this “sensitive” legal issue involving children. 
 Unconsciously, individuals can make choices that have signiªcant 
implications for social policy. The method that individuals use to 
make decisions with regard to acquiring children can have both posi-
tive and negative socials consequences. To the extent that those indi-
vidual decisions can negatively impact society -- economically, morally, 
or burden social services, the state arguably has a role in regulation. 
In the context of adoption, individuals make choices that can have 
                                                                                                                      
73 Both would-be parents and children alike have deep psychological desires and needs 
to be part of a family. See Joan Heifetz Hollinger, From Coitus to Commerce: Legal and Social 
Consequences of Noncoital Reproduction, 18 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 865, 875 (1985) (“Women 
especially have been socialized with the view that their self-esteem, their deepest sense of 
personhood, depends on their ability to bear a child.”). 
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signiªcant implications for a broader society, about which society 
should be concerned. 
 If the byproducts of free adoptions are two-tiered racial systems 
or racial hierarchies, it is an issue worth greater social scrutiny. Be-
yond race, society might also be concerned about middle class whites 
(and other groups) being priced out for white babies, which has a 
double negative effect. First, if the market responds only to the high-
est bidder with regard to white babies, it is possible that white babies 
will only be placed with wealthier families. The problem created by 
the free market is the legitimatization of a troubling normative view 
that adoption should only be among the wealthy and ignoring the 
class diversity in the United States, which could have a deterrent ef-
fect on “class diverse” adoptions. 
 Second, well-meaning, altruistic white parents who are able to 
share their home and love with another child, although not among the 
wealthiest of society, could be shut out of the adoption free market. Fi-
nally, there is the consideration of social involvement in shaping the 
lives of adoptees. Should we as a society be concerned that a special 
class of adoptees is created through free-market adoptions? After all, 
wealth based adoptions could lead to children being funneled into an 
“elite” class. How society addresses the free market in adoption or the 
individual decision-making in adoption will have a signiªcant social 
impact. There are several options society must weigh, and each is bur-
dened by what might be considered undesirable consequences by mar-
ket proponents. To the extent that agents are needed to service the 
adoption process, ªnancial transactions will always be involved. Our 
challenge is to determine a proper balance between the needs of chil-
dren, government responsibility, and individual autonomy. 
A. Price Caps 
 One option is to regulate the price of adoption. In this option, 
prices could be capped by the State. In this scenario, all adoptions 
would cost the same, regardless of the child’s race, gender, religion or 
other factors, including eye color, hair texture, and complexion. To the 
extent that even with price caps, the adoption of some children would 
be unaffordable, there could be adjustments. Critics would likely es-
chew this option as it interferes with individual autonomy and the free 
market. Others might oppose such an option because it unveils what we 
would otherwise want unrevealed, free market in adoptions. 
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B. Taxation 
 A second option to monitor and control the social impact of in-
dividual decision-making is taxation.74 In a taxation model, all adop-
tions with transaction fees would be assessed a progressive tax, mean-
ing that the government imposed fee would not be capped, but would 
be proportionate to the adoption fee. Under this proposal, all adop-
tions could have a ten percent fee attached. Alternatively, adoption 
fees over a “reasonable” dollar amount could be taxed at a higher 
rate, similar to property taxes within various municipalities. 
 Taxation helps to generate state and federal funds that can be 
used to promote the social welfare of children in foster care and 
adoption centers, thereby facilitating a positive social impact. For ex-
ample, taxation on free-market adoptions could be used to provide 
better care for children who are more difªcult to place, including 
children with disabilities, older children, and black children. Funds 
generated through taxation could also help to fund private foster care 
or permanent placements. Critics might equally be troubled by this 
model and suggest that it detracts from adoption of “desirable” babies 
by taxing well-meaning couples out of the adoption arena. Moreover, 
they could argue that individual autonomy is compromised through 
government taxation on adoption. Such criticisms, while true, are not 
so compelling as to limit governmental interference or interests in 
promoting the health and safety of all children. Nor, it seems, are 
adoption agents’ interests so severely burdened by this type of gov-
ernmental involvement that a protected interest is violated. 
C. Information 
 A ªnal option to address the negative social impact of the free 
market is information. Government sponsored information cam-
paigns have been used to promote organ donation, in anti-smoking 
campaigns, entreaties for mothers not to drink alcohol during preg-
nancy, and even more invasive efforts with regard to abortion. In the 
context of abortion, some states mandate a waiting period and that 
information be provided to the woman or girl seeking an abortion. 
Could this model be used with free-market adoptions? Currently, 
adoption agencies provide information to prospective parents, but 
perhaps there is an additional role for government to the extent that 
                                                                                                                      
74 Such options are used by the government to address other markets, such as alcohol 
and tobacco. 
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adoptions are not conducted in isolation, but impact the entire soci-
ety. This third option of greater governmental involvement through 
increased information as to the social impact of race-based decision-
making in adoption is, perhaps, the least invasive of the three options. 
 In order for Americans to truly understand the socio-economic 
implications of adoptions they must be provided information. Cur-
rently, the federal government does not take a role in providing in-
formation to adopting parents about the racial and socio-economic 
impact resulting from an adoption process driven by aesthetic prefer-
ences and perpetuated by a free market. Speciªcally, that thousands 
of children are permanently shut out of placement because of racial 
preferences is a disturbing message, and one that adopting parents 
should be made aware. Receiving information will not obligate poten-
tial parents to adopt black children. However, it might assist individu-
als and couples in making better informed decisions about adoptions 
and the best interests of children. Indeed, there is a legitimate gov-
ernmental function served by providing this data to the extent that 
the government has an interest in the health and safety of children 
left in its care and in semi-private foster care situations. 
 Critics of information driven remedies might rightfully identify 
certain shortcomings of such a policy-based proposal, including that it 
provides no guarantees of placement for black babies and children, 
and that it places an added burden on the government to address the 
racial impact of private arrangements. Yet, it seems that there is, as 
stated earlier, a valid governmental interest here, and, indeed, an obli-
gation to proactively act on behalf of its child citizens in adoption 
limbo. The burden on the government is not so weighty nor is such a 
proposal overly intrusive into the lives of prospective adopting parents 
to outright dismiss the proposal. The means of accomplishing or at 
least addressing this signiªcant governmental interest is not so burden-
some to the public as to trample any constitutional rights. To the con-
trary this government action further empowers citizens to make in-
formed choices. Finally, this proposal does not itself end race-based 
decision-making in adoption. However, we have learned with other in-
formation based campaigns from the labeling of cigarettes about the 
harmful effects to pregnant women, and public-service announcements 
about the dangers of drunk driving, that social movements can be in-
spired by information. Further, individuals can and will respond in the 
better interest of society and themselves when clear information ex-
plaining the social impact of consumer decision-making is dissemi-
nated. 
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Conclusion 
 If market forces exist in adoptions, should there be state-based 
regulation? Even Posner agrees that the vulnerable status of children 
requires some level of state participation and oversight in the adop-
tion process to prevent the exploitation and denigration of children. 
How should the ªne line of state responsibility and prospective paren-
tal autonomy be balanced? Greater state involvement in adoptions 
could create bureaucracies that have a deterrent effect or slow the 
adoption processes. Children who otherwise would be adopted may 
have longer waits. Indeed, there are pitfalls to governmental involve-
ment, but with attention to those problems, they can be overcome. 
 The attacks on market place inquiry in the realm of adoption 
generated by the Posner “baby selling” article unintentionally served 
to obscure less altruistic adoption practices and ignored relevant 
questions in the supply and demand of children. The backlash to 
some extent stiºed dialogue about the realities of adoption in the 
United States. Scholars have not rigorously scrutinized the market 
nature of adoptions and child supply. Greater dialogue is needed on 
this question that constructively examines the roles of government, 
judges, adoption agencies, and independent agents. This article is an 
attempt to generate dialogue on market nuances of contemporary 
adoption. 
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